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The past decade has witnessed a burgeoning interest in the
application of behavioral science to the law.' An earlier paradigm,
centered around law and economics, is being challenged by those
who would infuse a heavy dose of cognitive psychology, behavioral
economics, and behavioral decision theory into this mix. 2 The fron-
tispiece of a recent volume titled "Behavioral Law and Economics"3
defines this new field as one that aims to show how, with a clearer
knowledge of human behavior, we might be better able to predict
the actual effects of law and to assess the real, and potential, role
of law in society.4
The traditional approach to law and economics has assumed
standard economic principles in which homo economicus maxi-
mizes utility within a stable set of preferences, after gathering and
processing information in an optimal way. Simon sharply criti-
* Professor of Psychology, University of Oregon; President, Decision Re-
search. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of his colleagues at
Decision Research to the development of the ideas in this paper. In particular,
Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, Donald MacGregor, Stephen Johnson, and Jim
Flynn contributed to the work on the affect heuristic, and Robin Gregory and Terre
Satterfield contributed to the general discussion of affect and rationality. Financial
support from the National Science Foundation under grant SBR-9876587 and from
Dean Kathleen Hall Jamieson of The Annenberg School for Communication of the
University of Pennsylvania is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to C. K. Mertz
for assistance with the data analysis reported in Section IIIB.
1. See, e.g., Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Be-
havior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1495 (1998).
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cized this view, arguing that decision-making is better described in
terms of bounded rationality. 5 A boundedly rational decision
maker attempts to attain some satisfactory, although not necessa-
rily maximal, level of achievement. Simon's conceptualization
highlighted the role of perception, cognition and learning in deci-
sion-making and directed researchers to examine the psychological
processes by which decision problems are represented and infor-
mation is processed. 6
About the same time as Simon, Edwards introduced psycholo-
gists to the "exceedingly elaborate, mathematical and voluminous"
economic literature on choice and reviewed the handful of relevant
experimental studies then in existence.7
During the subsequent years of the past century, the informa-
tion processing view proposed by Simon has dominated empirical
research on judgment and decision-making.8 This has led to a tor-
rent of studies aimed at describing and understanding the mental
operations associated with these behaviors. The result has been a
far more complicated portrayal of decision-making than that pro-
vided by utility maximization theory. It is now generally recog-
nized among psychologists and among a growing number of legal
scholars that utility maximization provides only limited insight
into the processes by which decisions are made. For example, legal
scholars have become well aware of the research on the heuristics
and biases that affect judgments in the face of uncertainty. Dis-
cussions of hindsight bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, availa-
bility and representativeness appear frequently in the literature. 9
5. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environ-
ment, 63 Psychol. Rev. 129, 137-38 (1956).
6. See id. Some legal scholars have also rejected the standard view. Posner
contends that "economic analysis of law . .. long ago abandoned the model of
hyperrational, emotionless . . . nonstrategic man (or woman)[.J" Richard A. Pos-
ner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1552
(1998).
7. See Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, 51 Psychol. Bull. 380
(1954).
8. See Simon, supra note 5, at 129-38.
9. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999)
(presenting empirical evidence of market manipulation and its role in market fail-
ure) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar 1U; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
630 (1999) (reviewing thoroughly these phenomena and drawing out their implica-
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Preference and choice have also been subject to a great deal of
analysis by behavioral researchers and legal scholars. A basic as-
sumption of rational theories of choice is the principle of invari-
ance,10 which states that the relation of preference should not
change across equivalent descriptions of the options (description
invariance) or equivalent methods of elicitation (procedure invari-
ance). Without stability across equivalent descriptions and
equivalent elicitation procedures, one's preferences cannot be rep-
resented as maximization of utility.
A sizable body of research now shows that description invari-
ance and procedure invariance do not hold. Preferences appear to
be remarkably labile, sensitive to the way a choice problem is de-
scribed or "framed" and sensitive to the mode of response used to
express the preferences." These failures of invariance have con-
tributed to a new conception of judgment and choice in which be-
liefs and preferences are often constructed-not merely revealed-in
the elicitation process.
Among the specific empirical demonstrations of preference lia-
bility and manipulability that have interested legal scholars are
preference reversals, 12 prominence effects, 13 loss aversion,' 4 the
endowment effect,' 5 status quo and omission biases,' 6 framing
tions for market manipulation and products liability) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar
III.
10. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing
of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 251 (1986); Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in
Judgment and Choice, 95 Psychol. Rev. 371 (1988).
11. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing What You Want: Measuring Labile
Values, in Cognitive Processes in Choice and Decision Behavior 11741 (Thomas S.
Wallsten ed., 1980); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
Science 453 (1981).
12. See Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Reversals of Preference Between
Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions, 89 J. Experimental Psychol. 46 (1971);
Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Response-Induced Reversals of Preference in
Gambling: An Extended Replication in Las Vegas, 101 J. Experimental Psychol. 16
(1973).
13. See Tversky et al., supra note 10.
14. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 11; Robin Gregory et al., The Role of
Past States in Determining Reference Points for Policy Decisions, 55 Organizational
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 195 (1993).
15. See Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible
Indifference Curves, 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1277 (1989).
16. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Bias, 5 J.
Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1992).
2000] 165
166 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:163
effects 17 and mental accounting effects.' 8
The many studies showing that people do not behave accord-
ing to the dictates of utility theory have been troubling to econo-
mists, whose theories assume that people are rational in the sense
of having preferences that are complete and transitive and in the
sense of choosing what they most prefer. 19 Whatever the reluc-
tance of economists to acknowledge these behavioral phenomena,
legal scholars are certainly examining them carefully.20 As Sun-
stein observes:
Analysis of law should be linked with what we have been
learning about human behavior and choice. After all, the le-
gal system is pervasively in the business of constructing pref-
erences, descriptions, and contexts for choice . . . law can
construct rather than elicit preferences internally, by affect-
ing what happens in ordinary transactions, market and
nonmarket.21
Just as the law is continually evolving, so is our understand-
ing of the psychology of human judgment, preference and choice.
Behavioral researchers are coming to recognize that there is an-
other aspect of information-processing that has been rather ne-
glected-this is the automatic, experiential, affect-based side of our
mental life, which appears every bit as important as the analytic/
deliberative side that has been the focus of much prior research.
This article will describe new theory and empirical findings
demonstrating the powerful influence of affect on decision-making.
This work goes beyond the heuristics and biases work, which was
highly analytical, into the domain of experiential (affect-based)
17. See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preference for Alterna-
tive Therapies, 306 New Eng. J. Med. 1259 (1982).
18. See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 Market-
ing Sci. 199 (1985).
19. See generally David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of
Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 623 (1979)
(reacting to early reports of violations of procedure invariance); Daniel M. Heus-
man, On Dogmatism in Economics: The Case of Preference Reversals, 20 J. Socio-
Economics 205 (1991) (criticizing economists for failing to take these findings
seriously).
20. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 9; Hanson & Kysar 11, supra note 9;
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and De-
cision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499
(1998); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2.
21. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2.
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thinking. After describing this perspective, I shall examine recent
studies demonstrating how experiential thinking misleads young
smokers and causes them to misperceive the risks of smoking. Be-
cause experiential thinking is essential to rational behavior yet ca-
pable of misguiding us, I will argue that we humans are both
Rational Actors and Rational Fools.
II. THE AFFECT HEURISTIC
This section introduces a theoretical framework that describes
the importance of affect in guiding judgments and decisions. As
used here, "affect" means the specific quality of "goodness" or "bad-
ness" (i) experienced as a feeling state (with or without conscious
awareness) and (ii) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a
stimulus. Affective responses occur rapidly and automati-
cally-note how quickly you sense the feelings associated with the
stimulus word "treasure" or the word "hate." I shall argue that
reliance on such feelings can be characterized as "the affect heuris-
tic." In this section, I shall briefly trace the development of the
affect heuristic across a variety of research paths.22
A. Background
A strong early proponent of the importance of affect in deci-
sion-making was Zajonc, who argued that affective reactions to
stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically
and subsequently guiding information processing and judgment.
According to Zajonc, all perceptions contain some affect. "[w]e do
not just see 'a house': We see a handsome house, an ugly house, or
a pretentious house."23 He later adds:
We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational
manner and weight all the pros and cons of the various alter-
natives. But this is probably seldom the actual case. Quite
often 'I decided in favor of X' is no more than 'I liked X' ....
We buy the cars we like,' choose the jobs and houses we find
22. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in Intuitive Judgment: Heuris-
tics and Biases (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (on file with
author).
23. Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences,
35 Am. Psychol. 151, 154 (1980).
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'attractive,' and then justify these choices by various reasons
24
Affect also plays a central role in what have come to be known
as "dual-process theories" of thinking, knowing and information
processing. As Epstein has observed:
There is no dearth of evidence in every day life that people
apprehend reality in two fimdamentally different ways, one
variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal,
narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliber-
ative, verbal, and rational. 25
Table 1,26 adapted from Epstein, further compares these two
systems. One of the characteristics of the experiential system is its
affective basis. Although analysis is certainly important in many
decision-making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is a
quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex,
uncertain and sometimes dangerous world. Many theorists have
given affect a direct and primary role in motivating behavior. Ep-
stein's view on this is as follows:
The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associ-
ated with the experience of affect,... which refer[s] to subtle
feelings of which people are often unaware. When a person
responds to an emotionally significant event.., the experien-
tial system automatically searches its memory banks for re-
lated events, including their emotional accompaniments ....
If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions
and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the
feelings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts
anticipated to avoid the feelings. 27
Also emphasizing the motivational role of affect, Mowrer con-
ceptualized conditioned emotional responses to images as prospec-
tive gains and losses that directly "guide and control performance
in a generally sensible adaptive manner."28 He criticized theorists
who postulate purely cognitive variables, such as expectancies
(probabilities) intervening between stimulus and response, cau-
tioning that we must be careful not to leave the organism at the
24. Id. at 155.
25. Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic Uncon-
scious, 49 Am. Psychol. 709, 710 (1994).
26. See infra app., tbl.l.
27. Epstein, supra note 25, at 716.
28. 0. Hobart Mowrer, Learning Theory and Behavior 30 (1960).
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choice point "lost in thought." Mowrer's solution was to view ex-
pectancies more dynamically (as conditioned emotions such as
hopes and fears), serving as motivating states leading to action.
One of the most comprehensive and dramatic theoretical ac-
counts of the role of affect in decision-making is presented by the
neurologist Antonio Damasio, in his book Descartes' Error: Emo-
tion, Reason, and the Human Brain.29 Damasio's theory is derived
from observations of patients with damage to the ventromedial
frontal cortices of the brain that has left their basic intelligence,
memory and capacity for logical thought intact but has impaired
their ability to "feel"-that is, to associate affective feelings and
emotions with the anticipated consequences of their actions.30
Close observation of these patients combined with a number of ex-
perimental studies led Damasio to argue that this type of brain
damage induces a form of sociopathy3l that destroys the individ-
ual's ability to make rational decisions; that is, decisions that are
in his or her best interests. Persons suffering from this type of
damage became socially dysfunctional even though they remain in-
tellectually capable of analytical reasoning.
Commenting on one particularly significant case, Damasio
observes:
The instruments usually considered necessary and sufficient
for rational behavior were intact in him. He had the requisite
knowledge, attention, and memory; his language was flaw-
less; he could perform calculations; he could tackle the logic of
an abstract problem. There was only one significant accom-
paniment to his decision-making failure: a marked alteration
of the ability to experience feelings. Flawed reason and im-
paired feelings stood out together as the consequences of a
specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me
that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of
reason.
3 2
29. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (1994).
30. See id.
31. See Antonio R. Damasio et aL, Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior
Caused by Frontal Damages Fail to Respond Automatically to Social Stimuli, 41
Behav. Brain Res. 81 (1990).
32. Damasio, supra note 29, at xii.
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In seeking to determine "what in the brain allows humans to be-
have rationally,"33 Damasio argues that thought is made largely
from images, broadly construed to include sounds, smells, real or
imagined visual impressions, ideas and words. 34 A lifetime of
learning leads these images to become "marked" by positive and
negative feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily
states (Mowrer and other learning theorists would call this condi-
tioning). "In short, somatic markers are... feelings generated from
secondary emotions. These emotions and feelings have been con-
nected, by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scena-
rios."3 5 When a negative somatic marker is linked to an image of a
future outcome it sounds an alarm. When a positive marker is as-
sociated with the outcome image, it becomes a beacon of incentive.
Damasio concludes that somatic markers increase the accuracy
and efficiency of the decision process and their absence degrades
performance by "compromising the rationality that makes us dis-
tinctly human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense
of personal future, social convention, and moral principle."36
Based on ideas about affect marking images, 37 which in turn
motivates behavior, 38 affect can be portrayed as an essential com-
ponent in many forms of judgment and decision-making. Specifi-
cally it was proposed that people use an affect heuristic to make
judgments. 39 That is, representations of objects and events in peo-
ple's minds are tagged to varying degrees with affect. In the pro-
cess of making a judgment or decision, people consult or refer to an
"affect pool" containing all the positive and negative tags associ-
ated with the representations consciously or unconsciously. Just
as imaginability, memorability and similarity serve as cues for
probability judgments, 40 affect may serve as a cue for many impor-
tant judgments. Relying on an affective impression can be far eas-
ier-more efficient-than weighing the pros and cons or retrieving
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 174.
36. Id. at xii.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 25; Mowrer, supra note 28.
39. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk
and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1 (2000).
40. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Un-
certainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974) (describing the availabil-
ity and representativeness heuristics).
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from memory many relevant examples, especially when the re-
quired judgment or decision is complex or mental resources are
limited. This characterization of a mental short-cut leads to label-
ing the use of affect a "heuristic."
B. Empirical Evidence
This section presents and integrates a series of diverse studies
demonstrating the operation of the affect heuristic.
1. Manipulating Preferences Through Controlled Exposures
The fundamental nature and importance of affect has been
demonstrated repeatedly in a remarkable series of studies by
Zajonc and his colleagues.41 The concept of stimulus exposure is
central to all of these studies. The central finding is that, when
objects are presented to an individual repeatedly, the "mere expo-
sure" is capable of creating a positive attitude or preference for
these objects.
In the typical study, stimuli such as nonsense phrases, faces or
Chinese ideographs are presented to the subject at varying fre-
quencies. In a later session, the subject judges these stimuli on
liking or familiarity, or both. The more frequent the exposure to a
stimulus, the more positive the response. A meta-analysis of mere
exposure research published between 1968 and 1987 included over
200 experiments examining the exposure-affect relationship.42
Unreinforced exposures were found to reliably enhance affect to-
ward visual, auditory, gustatory, abstract, and social stimuli.43
Winkielman, Zajonc and Schwarz demonstrated the speed
with which affect can influence judgments in studies employing a
subliminal priming paradigm." Participants were "primed"
through exposure to a smiling face, a frowning face, or a neutral
polygon presented for 11250 of a second, an interval so brief that
there is no recognition or recall of the stimulus.4 5 Immediately fol-
41. See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. Pers.
& Soc. Psychol. Monograph 1 (1968).
42. See Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis
of Research, 1968-1987, 106 Psychol. Bull. 265 (1989).
43. See id.
44. See Piotr Winkielman et al., Subliminal Affective Priming Resists Attibu-
tional Interventions, 11 Cognition and Emotion 43 (1997).
45. See id.
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lowing this exposure, an ideograph was presented for two seconds,
after which the subject rated the ideograph on a scale of liking.46
Mean liking ratings were significantly higher for ideographs pre-
ceded by smiling faces.47 This effect was lasting. In a second ses-
sion, ideographs were primed by the "other face," the one not
associated with the stimulus in the first session.48 This second
priming was ineffective because the effect of the first priming
remained.49
The perseverance of induced preferences was tested by Sher-
man, Kim and Zajonc5° who asked participants to study Chinese
characters and their English meanings. 51 Half of the meanings
were positive (e.g., beauty), half were negative (e.g., disease).52
Then participants were given a test of these meanings followed by
a test in which they were given pairs of characters and were asked
to choose the one they preferred. 53 Participants preferred charac-
ters with positive meaning 70% of the time. 54 Next, the characters
were presented with neutral meanings (e.g., desk, linen) and sub-
jects were told that these were the "true" meanings.55 The testing
procedure was repeated and, despite learning the new meanings,
the preferences remained the same.56 Characters that had been
initially paired with positive meanings still tended to be
preferred.57
These various studies demonstrate that affect is a strong con-
ditioner of preference, whether or not the cause of that affect is
consciously perceived. They also demonstrate the independence of
affect from cognition, indicating that there may be conditions of
affective or emotional arousal that do not necessarily require cog-
nitive appraisal. This affective mode of response, unburdened by





50. See D. A. Sherman et al., Affective Perseverance: Cognitions Change but






56. See Sherman et al., supra note 50.
57. See id.
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2. Image, Affect and Decision-making
Consistent with the literature just reviewed, a number of non-
laboratory studies have also demonstrated a strong relationship
between imagery, affect and decision-making. 58 Many of these
studies used a word-association technique to discover the affective
connections that the individual had learned through life exper-
iences.59 This method presents subjects with a target stimulus,
usually a word or very brief phrase, and asks them to provide the
first thought or image that comes to mind.60 The process is then
repeated a number of times, say three to six, or until no further
associations are generated. 6 ' Following the elicitation of images,
subjects are asked to rate each image they give on a scale ranging
from very positive (e.g., +2) to very negative (e.g., -2), with a neu-
tral point in the center.6 2 Scoring is done by summing or averag-
ing the ratings to obtain an overall index.6 3
This imagery method has been used successfully to measure
the affective meanings that influence people's preferences for dif-
ferent cities and states6 4 as well as their support or opposition to
technologies such as nuclear power.6 5
Table 266 illustrates the method in a task where one respon-
dent was asked to give associations to each of two cities and, later,
to rate each image affectively. The cities in this example show the
clear affective superiority of San Diego over Denver.67 The study
showed that summed image scores such as these were highly pre-
dictive of expressed preferences for living in or visiting cities.68 In
58. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Eco-
nomic Impacts of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 11 Risk Anal-
ysis 683 (1991); Alida Benthin et al., Adolescent Health-Threatening and Health-
Enhancing Behaviors: A Study of Word Association and Imagery, 17 J. Adolescent
Health 143 (1995); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews
as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J.
Applied Psychol. 1427 (1996); Donald G. MacGregor et al., Imagery, Affect, and
Financial Judgment, 1 J. Psychol. & Fin. Markets 104 (2000).
59. See Slovic et al., supra note 58; Benthin et al., supra note 58.
60. See Slovic et al., supra note 58, at 688; Benthin, supra note 58, at 145.
61. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 690-91.
64. See id.
65. See Peters & Slovic, supra note 58, at 1428.
66. See infra app., tbl.2.
67. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.
68. See id. at 690.
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one study they found that the image score predicted the location of
actual vacations during the next eighteen months.6 9
Subsequent studies have found affect-laden imagery elicited
by word associations to be predictive of preferences for investing in
new companies on the stock market 70 and predictive of adoles-
cents' decisions to take part in health-threatening and health-en-
hancing behaviors such as smoking and exercise. 71
3. Evaluability
The research described above points to the importance of affec-
tive impressions in judgments and decisions. However, the im-
pressions themselves may vary not only in their valence but in the
precision with which they are held. It turns out that the precision
of an affective impression substantially impacts judgments.
The distributional qualities of affective impressions and re-
sponses can be conceptualized as "affective mappings." Consider,
for example, some questions posed by Mellers, Richards and Birn-
baum: "How much would you like a potential roommate if all you
knew about her was that she was said to be intelligent?"72 Or,
"Suppose, instead, all you knew about her was that she was said to
be obnoxious?"73 Intelligence is a favorable trait but it is not very
diagnostic (e.g., meaningful) for likeableness, hence its affective
map is rather diffuse.74 In contrast, obnoxiousness will likely pro-
duce a more precise and more negative impression.75
How much would you like a roommate said to be both intelli-
gent and obnoxious? Anderson has shown that the integration of
multiple pieces of information into an impression of this sort can
be described well by a weighted-average model where separate
weights are given to intelligence and obnoxiousness, respec-
tively.76 Mellers' study further showed that the weights in such
integrative tasks are inversely proportional to the variance of the
69. See id.
70. See MacGregor et al., supra note 58.
71. See Benthin et al., supra note 58.
72. Barbara A. Mellers et al., Distributional Theories of Impression Forma-




76. See Norman H. Anderson, Foundations of Information Integration Theory
(1981).
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impressions. 77 Thus we would expect the impression produced by
the combination of these two traits to be closer to the impression
formed by obnoxiousness alone, reflecting greater weight given to
obnoxiousness due to its smaller variance (more precise affective
mapping). The meaning of a stimulus image appears to be re-
flected in the precision of the affective feelings associated with that
image. More precise affective impressions reflect more precise
meanings and carry more weight in impression formation, judg-
ment and decision-making.
Hsee developed the notion of evaluability to describe the inter-
play between the precision of an affective impression and its mean-
ing or importance for judgment and decision-making. 78
Evaluability is illustrated by an experiment in which Hsee asked
people to assume they were music majors looking for a used music
dictionary. In a joint-evaluation condition, participants were
shown two dictionaries, A and B (see Table 3), and asked how
much they would be willing to pay for each. 79 Willingness-to-pay
was far higher for Dictionary B, presumably because of its greater
number of entries. However, when one group of participants eval-
uated only A and another group evaluated only B, the mean will-
ingness to pay was much higher for Dictionary A. Hsee explains
this reversal by means of the evaluability principle. He argues
that, without a direct comparison, the number of entries is hard to
evaluate, because the evaluator does not have a precise notion of
how good or how bad 10,000 (or 20,000) entries are. However, the
defects attribute is evaluable in the sense that it translates easily
into a precise good/bad response and thus it carries more weight in
the independent evaluation. Most people find a defective diction-
ary unattractive and a like-new one attractive. Under joint evalu-
ation, the buyer can see that B is far superior on the more
77. See Mellers et al., supra note 72.
78. See Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors
Influence Judgments, 66 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 122
(1996) [hereinafter Hsee I]; Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An
Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of
Alternatives, 67 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 242 (1996)
[hereinafter Hsee II]; Christopher K. Hsee, Less is Better: When Low-Value Op-
tions Are Valued More Highly Than High-Value Options, 11 J. Behav. Decision
Making 107 (1998) [hereinafter Hsee III].
79. See infra app., tbl.3.
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important attribute, number of entries. Thus number of entries
becomes evaluable through the comparison process.
According to the evaluability principle, the weight of a stimu-
lus attribute in an evaluative judgment or choice is proportional to
the ease or precision with which the value of that attribute (or a
comparison on the attribute across alternatives) is mapped into an
affective impression. In other words, affect bestows meaning on
information8 o and the precision of the affective meaning influences
our ability to use information in judgment and decision-making.
Evaluability can thus be seen as an extension of the general rela-
tionship between the variance of an impression and its weight in
an impression-formation task.8 '
Hsee's work in evaluability is noteworthy because it shows
that even very important attributes may not be used by a judge or
decision maker unless they can be translated precisely into an af-
fective frame of reference. As described in the next section, Hsee
finds evaluability effects even with familiar attributes such as the
amount of ice cream in a cup.82 Similar effects have also been
demonstrated with other familiar things such as amounts of
money or human lives.
4. Proportion Dominance
In situations that involve uncertainty about whether we will
win or lose or that involve ambiguity about some quantity of some-
thing (i.e., how much is enough), there appears to be one informa-
tion format that is highly evaluable, leading it to carry great
weight in many judgment tasks. This is a representation charac-
terizing an attribute as a proportion or percentage of something, or
as a probability. We shall refer to the strong effects of this type of
representation as "proportion dominance."83
A mundane and innocent form of proportion dominance has
been demonstrated by Hsee, who found that an overfilled ice cream
container with 7 oz. of ice cream was valued more highly (mea-
sured by willingness to pay) than an underfilled container with 8
oz. of ice cream.8 4 This "less is better effect" reversed itself when
80. See Charles E. Osgood et al., The Measurement of Meaning (1957).
81. See Mellers et al., supra note 72.
82. See Hsee III, supra note 78, at 111-14.
83. I thank Chris Hsee for suggesting this term.
84. See Hsee III, supra note 78; infra app., fig.1.
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the options were juxtaposed and evaluated together.85 Thus, the
proportion of the serving cup that was filled appeared to be more
evaluable (in separate judgments) than the absolute amount of ice
cream.
86
A rather different demonstration of proportion dominance
comes from studies of preferences among simple gambles. It has
long been known that the rated attractiveness of a gamble offering
the chance to win some monetary payoff was typically more deter-
mined by the probability of winning that by the size of the payoff.8 7
Consider the gamble offering 7 chances out of 36 (played on a rou-
lette wheel with 36 numbers) to win $9 (otherwise get nothing).
The relatively high weight given the probability when rating
the attractiveness of such gambles may be explained by the fact
that the probabilities are more readily interpreted as attractive or
unattractive than are the payoffs. For example, seven out of
thirty-six chances to win are rather unattractive odds; on the other
hand, a $9 payoff may be harder to evaluate because its attractive-
ness depends upon what other payoffs are available.
If we could make a gamble's payoff more evaluable, that is,
more readily perceived as good or bad, we would presumably en-
hance the weight given to payoff in the attractiveness rating.88
One group of subjects rated the gamble, 7/36 win $9, on a twenty-
point scale varying from zero (not at all attractive) to twenty (very
attractive).8 9 The mean rating was 9.4.9
Hypothesizing that the attractiveness of $9 might not be read-
ily apparent, we reasoned that a bet offering $9 to win and only 50
to lose should appear to have a very attractive payoff ratio.91 This
led us to predict that one might increase the attractiveness of a
gamble by adding a small loss to it.92 This prediction was con-
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Relative Importance of Probabilities
and Payoffs in Risk Taking, 78 J. Experimental Psychol. Monograph 1 (1968); Wil-
liam M. Goldstein & Hillel J. Einhorn, Expression Theory and the Preference Re-
versal Phenomena, 94 Psychol. Rev. 236 (1987).
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firmed. Adding a 5v loss boosted the mean attractiveness rating
from 9.4 to 14.9.93
This curious finding, that adding a small loss to a gamble in-
creases its rated attractiveness, fits well with the notions of affec-
tive mapping and evaluability. According to this view, a
probability maps relatively precisely onto the attractiveness scale
because probability has a lower and upper bound (0 and 1) and a
midpoint below which a probability is "poor" or "bad" (i.e., has
worse than an even chance) and above which it is "good" (i.e., has a
better than even chance). People know where a given value, such
as 7/36, falls within the bounds, and what it means-"I'm probably
not going to win." In contrast, the mapping of a dollar outcome
(e.g., $9) onto the attractiveness scale is diffuse, reflecting a failure
to know how good or bad or how attractive or unattractive $9 is.
Thus, the impression formed by the gamble offering $9 to win with
no losing payoff is dominated by the relatively precise and unat-
tractive impression produced by the 7/36 probability of winning.
However, adding a very small loss to the payoff dimension brings
the $9 payoff into focus and thus gives it meaning. The combina-
tion of a possible $9 gain and a 5¢ loss is a very attractive win/loss
ratio, leading to a relatively precise mapping onto the upper end of
the scale. Whereas the imprecise mapping of the $9 carries little
weight in the averaging process, the more precise and now
favorable impression of $9 and 5¢ carries more weight, thus lead-
ing to an increase in the overall favorability of the gamble.
Proportion dominance surfaces in a powerful way in a very dif-
ferent context, studies of life-saving interventions.9 4 For example,
one study found that people's willingness to intervene to save a
stated number of lives was determined more by the proportion of
lives saved than by the actual number of lives that would be
saved.95 However, when two or more interventions were directly
compared, number of lives saved became more important than pro-
93. See id.
94. See David Fethersonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life:
A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 283 (1997);
Jonathan Baron, Confusion of Relative and Absolute Risk in Valuation, 14 J. Risk
& Uncertainty 301 (1997); Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the
"Identifiable Victim Effect," 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 235 (1997); James Friedrich
et al., Psychophysical Numbing: When Lives Are Valued Less as the Lives At Risk
Increase, 8 J. Consumer Psychol. 277 (1999).
95. See Fetherstonhaugh et al., supra note 94, at 297.
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portion saved. 96 Thus, number of lives saved, standing alone, ap-
pears to be poorly evaluable, 97 as was the case for number of
entries in Hsee's music dictionaries. With a side-by-side compari-
son, the number of lives became clearly evaluable and important,98
as also happened with the number of dictionary entries.
Slovic, drawing upon proportion dominance and the limited
evaluability of numbers of lives, predicted (and found) that people
would more strongly support an airport-safety measure expected to
save 98% of 150 lives at risk than a measure expected to save 150
lives. 99 Saving 150 lives is diffusely good, hence only weakly
evaluable, whereas saving 98% of something is clearly very good
because it is so close to the upper bound on the percentage scale,
and hence is highly evaluable and highly weighted in the support
judgment. 1°° Subsequent reduction of the percentage of 150 lives
that would be saved to 95%, 90%, and 85% led to reduced support
for the safety measure but each of these percentage conditions still
garnered a higher mean level of support than did the save 150 lives
condition.' 01
5. Insensitivity to Probability
Outcomes are not always affectively as vague as the quantities
of money, ice cream and lives that were dominated by proportion in
the above experiments. When consequences carry sharp and
strong affective meaning, as is the case with a lottery jackpot or a
cancer, the opposite phenomenon occurs-variation in probability
often carries too little weight. As Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and
Welch observe, one's images and feelings toward winning the lot-
tery are likely to be similar whether the probability of winning is
one in 10 million or one in 10,000.102 They further note that re-
sponse to uncertain situations appears to have an all or none char-
acteristic that is sensitive to the possibility rather than the
96. See id. at 296-97.
97. See id. at 297.
98. See id. at 291.
99. See Slovic et al., supra note 22. This was, of course, a between-groups
study. In a side-by-side comparison, everyone gives more support to saving all 150
lives.
100. See id.
101. See id.; infra app., tbl.4.
102. See George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, Psychol. Bull. (forthcom-
ing 2001).
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probability of strong positive or negative consequences, causing
very small probabilities to carry great weight.'10 This, they argue,
helps explain many paradoxical findings such as the simultaneous
prevalence of gambling and the purchasing of insurance.'04 It also
explains why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear
power and exposure to extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals
fail to recede in response to information about the very small
probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards.'0 5
Support for these arguments comes from Rottenstreich and Hsee,
who show that if the potential outcome of a gamble is emotionally
powerful, its attractiveness or unattractiveness is relatively insen-
sitive to changes in probability as great as from .99 to .01.106
6. The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk and Benefit
Another stream of research that, in conjunction with many of
the findings reported above, led to recognition of the affect heuris-
tic, had its origin in an early study of risk perception. 0 7 One of the
findings in that study and subsequent replications of it was that
perception of risk and society's response to risk was strongly linked
to the degree to which a hazard evoked feelings of dread.'08 Thus
activities associated with cancer (e.g., activities exposing people to
radiation or toxic chemicals) are seen as riskier and more in need
of regulation than activities associated with less dreaded forms of
illness, injury, and death (e.g., accidents).
A second finding in the study'0 9 has been even more instru-
mental in the study of the affect heuristic. This is the finding that
judgments of risk and benefit are negatively correlated. 110 For
many hazards, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the per-
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks, 12 Risk Analysis 215 (1992).
106. See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses & Electric
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, Psychol. Sci. (forthcoming 2001) (man-
uscript on file with author).
107. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric
Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Policy Sci. 127
(1978).
108. See id. at 140; Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 281-83
(1987).
109. See Fischhoff et al., supra note 107.
110. See id. at 148-49.
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ceived risk and vice versa.'11 Smoking, alcoholic beverages and
food additives, for example, tend to be seen as very high in risk and
relatively low in benefit, whereas vaccines, antibiotics and x-rays
tend to be seen as high in benefit and relatively low in risk.
1 2
This negative relationship is noteworthy because it occurs even
when the nature of the gains or benefits from an activity is distinct
and qualitatively different from the nature of the risks. That the
inverse relationship is generated in people's minds is suggested by
the fact that risk and benefit generally tend to be positively (if at
all) correlated in the world.1 3 Activities that bring great benefits
may be high or low in risk but activities that are low in benefit are
unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they would be
proscribed). 114
A study by Alhakami and Slovic found that the inverse rela-
tionship between perceived risk and perceived benefit of an activ-
ity (e.g., using pesticides) was linked to the strength of positive or
negative affect associated with that activity."15 This result implies
that people base their judgments of an activity or a technology not
only on what they think about it but also on what they feel about
it.116 If they like an activity, they are moved to judge the risks as
low and the benefits as high; if they dislike it, they tend to judge
the opposite-high risk and low benefit. 1 7
Alhakami and Slovic's findings suggested that use of the affect
heuristic guides perceptions of risk and benefit, as depicted in Fig-
ure 2.118 If so, providing information about risk should change the
perception of benefit and vice-versa. 119 For example, information
stating that benefit was high for some technology should lead to
more positive overall affect that would, in turn, decrease perceived
111. See id.
112. See id. at 147.
113. See id. at 148-49.
114. See id. This inverse relationship is found as well when the correlation is
computed across individuals judging the same activity. Thus one person may judge
nuclear power to be high in risk and low in benefit whereas another might judge it
low in risk and high in benefit.
115. See Ali S. Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085
(1994).
116. See id. at 1088.
117. See id. at 1094-95.
118. See infra app., fig.2.
119. See infra app., fig.3.
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risk. 120 Indeed, Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson con-
ducted this experiment, providing four different kinds of informa-
tion designed to manipulate affect by increasing or decreasing
perceived risk and increasing or decreasing perceived benefit.121
In each case there was no apparent logical relation between the
information provided (e.g., information about risks) and the
nonmanipulated variable (e.g., benefits).122 The predictions were
confirmed.123 When the information that was provided changed ei-
ther the perceived risk or the perceived benefit, an affectively con-
gruent but inverse effect was observed on the non-manipulated
attribute, as depicted in Figure 3.124 These findings support the
theory that risk and benefit judgments are causally determined, at
least in part, by the overall affective evaluation.
The affect heuristic also predicts that using time pressure to
reduce the opportunity for analytic deliberation (and thereby al-
lowing affective considerations freer rein), should enhance the in-
verse relationship between perceived benefits and risks. In a
second study, Finucane and others showed that the inverse rela-
tionship between perceived risks and benefits increased under
time pressure, as predicted. 125 These two experiments with judg-
ments of benefits and risks are important because they support the
contention by Zajonc that affect influences judgment directly and
is not simply a response to a prior analytic evaluation. 126
7. Judgments of Probability, Relative Frequency, and Risk
The affect heuristic has much in common with the model of
"risk as feelings" proposed by Loewenstein and with dual process
theories put forth by Epstein, Sloman and others. 127 Recall that
Epstein argues that individuals apprehend reality by two interac-
tive, parallel processing systems. 128 The rational system is a de-
120. See Alkahmi & Slovic, supra note 115, at 1094-95.
121. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
122. See id. at 1.
123. See id.
124. See infra app., fig.3.
125. See Finucane et al., supra note 39, at 9-13.
126. See Zajonc, supra note 24.
127. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102; Epstein, supra note 25; Steven A.
Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3
(1996).
128. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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liberative, analytical system that functions by way of established
rules of logic and evidence (e.g., probability theory).129 The experi-
ential system encodes reality in images, metaphors and narratives
to which affective feelings have become attached. 130
To demonstrate the influence of the experiential system,
Denes-Raj and Epstein showed that, when offered a chance to win
a prize by drawing a red jelly bean from an urn, subjects often
elected to draw from a bowl containing a greater absolute number,
but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a
bowl with fewer red beans but a better probability of winning (e.g.,
1 in 10).131 For these individuals, images of 7 winning beans in the
large bowl appeared to dominate the image of 1 winning bean in
the small bowl. l3 2
We can characterize Epstein's subjects as following a mental
strategy of "imaging the numerator" (i.e., the number of red beans)
and neglecting the denominator (the number of beans in the bowl).
Consistent with the affect heuristic, images of winning beans con-
vey positive affect that motivates choice.
Although the jelly bean experiment may seem frivolous, imag-
ing the numerator brings affect to bear on judgments in ways that
can be both non-intuitive and consequential. Slovic, Monahan and
MacGregor demonstrated this in a series of studies in which exper-
ienced forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to judge
the likelihood that a mental patient would commit an act of vio-
lence within 6 months after being discharged from the hospital.133
An important finding was that clinicians who were given another
expert's assessment of a patient's risk of violence framed in terms
of a relative frequency (e.g., of every 100 patients similar to Mr.
Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of violence to others) sub-
sequently labeled Mr. Jones as more dangerous than did clinicians
who were shown a "statistically equivalent" risk expressed as a
129. See id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
131. See Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive
and Rational Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66
J. Personality & Social Psychol. 819 (1994).
132. See id. at 823.
133. See Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication:
The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing
Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 L. & Hum. Behav. 271 (2000).
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probability' 3 ' (e.g., "Patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to
have a 10% chance of committing an act of violence to others" 3 5).
Similar results have been found by Yamagishi, whose judges rated
a disease that kills 1,286 people out of every 10,000 as more dan-
gerous than one that kills 24.14% of the population.' 36
Not surprisingly, when clinicians were told that "20 out of
every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to commit an
act of violence,"' 3 7 41% would refuse to discharge the patient. 138
But when another group of clinicians was given the risk as "pa-
tients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 20% chance of
committing an act of violence," only 21% would refuse to discharge
the patient.139
Follow-up studies showed that representations of risk in the
form of individual probabilities of 10% or 20% led to relatively be-
nign images of one person, unlikely to harm anyone, whereas the
"equivalent" frequentistic representations created frightening
images of violent patients (e.g., "Some guy going crazy and killing
someone").14° These affect-laden images likely induced greater
perceptions of risk in response to the relative-frequency frames.
Although frequency formats produce affect-laden imagery,
story and narrative formats appear to do even better in that re-
gard. Hendrickx, Vlek and Oppewal found that warnings were
more effective when, rather than being presented in terms of rela-
tive frequencies of harm, they were presented in the form of vivid,
affect-laden scenarios and anecdotes."14 Sanfey and Hastie found
that, compared with respondents given information in bar graphs
or data tables, respondents given narrative information more accu-
134. See id. at 289-90.
135, Id.
136. See Kimihiko Yamagishi, When a 12.86% Mortality is More Dangerous
than 24.14%: Implications for Risk Communication, 11 Applied Cognitive Psychol.
495, 504 (1997).
137. Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 288.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 291-93.
141. See Laurie Hendrickx et al., Relative Importance of Scenario Information
and Frequency Information in the Judgment of Risk, 72 Acta Psychologica 41, 58-
60 (1989).
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rately estimated the performance of a set of marathon runners. 142
Furthermore, Pennington and Hastie found that jurors construct
narrative-like summations of trial evidence to help them process
their judgments of guilt or innocence. 143 The potency of narrative
may be due to affect increasing the memorability of information'"
or enhancing individuals' engagement in the task which in turn
facilitates the comprehension and integration of information.
145
Perhaps the biases in probability and frequency judgment that
have been attributed to the availability heuristic146 may be due, at
least in part, to affect. Availability may work not only through
ease of recall or imaginability, but because remembered and
imagined images come tagged with affect. For example, Lichten-
stein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs invoked availability to
explain why judged frequencies of highly publicized causes of
death (e.g., accidents, homicides, fires, tornadoes and cancer) were
relatively overestimated and underpublicized causes (e.g., diabe-
tes, stroke, asthma, tuberculosis) were underestimated. 147 The
highly publicized causes appear to be more affectively charged,
that is, more sensational, and this may account both for their
prominence in the media and their relatively overestimated
frequencies.
III. FURTHER EVIDENCE
The studies described above represent only a small fraction of
the evidence that can be marshaled in support of the affect heuris-
tic. Although we have developed the affect heuristic to explain
findings from studies of judgment and decision-making (e.g., the
inverse relationship between perceived risks and benefits), one can
142. See Alan Sanfey & Reid Hastie, Does Evidence Presentation Format Affect
Judgment? An Experimental Evaluation of Displays of Data for Judgments, 9
Psychol. Sci. 99, 103 (1998).
143. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-Based De-
cision Making, in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods 188, 194-96 (G.
Klein et al. eds., 1993).
144. See Vincent Price & Edward J. Czilli, Modeling Patterns of News Recogni-
tion and Recall, 46 J. Comm. 55 (1996).
145. See Keith Oatley, A Taxonomy of Literary Response and a Theory of Identi-
fication in Fictional Narrative, 23 Poetics 53 (1994).
146. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judg-
ing Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207 (1973).
147. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Ex-
perimental Psychol.: Hum. Learning & Memory 551 (1978).
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find related proposals in the literature of marketing and social cog-
nition. For example, Wright proposed the "affect-referral heuristic"
as a mechanism by which the remembered affect associated with a
product influences subsequent choice of that product. 148
Attitudes have long been recognized as having a strong evalu-
ative component.149 Pratkanis defined attitude as "a person's eval-
uation of an object of thought."150 He went on to propose that
attitudes serve as heuristics, with positive attitudes invoking a
favoring strategy toward an object and negative attitudes creating
disfavoring response. 151 More specifically, he defined the "attitude
heuristic" as the use of the evaluative relationship as a cue for as-
signing objects to a favorable class or an unfavorable class, thus
leading to approach or avoidance strategies appropriate to the
class.' 52 Pratkanis described numerous phenomena that could be
explained by the attitude heuristic, including halo effects not un-
like the consistency described earlier between risk and benefit
judgments.' 5 3
Other important work within the field of social cognition in-
cludes studies by Faziol 54 on the accessibility of affect associated
with attitudes and by Schwarz and Clore on the role of affect as
information.' 5 5
Hsee and Kunreuther have demonstrated that affect influ-
ences decisions about whether or not to purchase insurance. 5 6 In
one study, they found that people were willing to pay twice as
much to insure a beloved antique clock (that no longer works and
148. See Peter Wright, Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplifying Versus Opti-
mizing, 12 J. Marketing Res. 60 (1975); Michel T. Pham, Representativeness, Rele-
vance, and the Use of Feelings in Decision Making, 25 J. Consumer Res. 144 (1998).
149. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7.
150. Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Cognitive Representation of Attitudes, in Atti-
tude Structure and Function 72 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
154. See Russell H. Fazio, Attitudes as Object-Evaluation Associations: Deter-
minants, Consequences, and Correlates of Attitude Accessibility, in Attitude
Strength: Antecedents and Consequences 247 (Richard F. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick
eds., 1995).
155. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I Feel About It? Informa-
tive Functions of Affective States, in Affect, Cognition, and Social Behavior: New
Evidence and Integrative Attempts (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph P. Forgas eds., 1988).
156. See Christopher K. Hsee & Howard Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. Risk & Uncertainty 141, 153-54 (2000).
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cannot be repaired) against loss in shipment to a new city than to
insure a similar clock for which one does not have any special feel-
ing.157 In the event of loss, the insurance paid $100 in both
cases. 158 Similarly, Hsee and Menon found that students were
more willing to buy a warranty on a newly purchased used car if it
was a beautiful convertible than if it was an ordinary looking sta-
tion wagon, even if the expected repair expenses and cost of the
warranty were held constant. 159
A study by Loewenstein and others provides a particularly
thorough review and analysis of research that supports their "risk-
as-feelings hypothesis," a concept that has much in common with
the affect heuristic. 160 They present evidence showing that emo-
tional responses to risky situations, including feelings such as
worry, fear, dread or anxiety, often diverge from cognitive evalua-
tions and have a different and sometimes greater impact on risk-
taking behavior than do cognitive evaluations. 161 Among the fac-
tors that appear to influence risk behaviors by acting on feelings
rather than cognitions are background mood, 162 the time interval
between decisions and their outcomes, 63 vividness,164 and evolu-
tionary preparedness. Loewenstein and others invoke the evolu-
tionary perspective to explain why people tend to react with little
fear to certain types of objectively dangerous stimuli that evolution
has not prepared them for, such as guns, hamburgers, automo-
biles, smoking and unsafe sex, even when they recognize the threat
at a cognitive level. 16 5 Other types of stimuli, such as caged spi-
ders, snakes or heights, which evolution may have prepared us to
fear, evoke strong visceral responses even when we recognize
them, cognitively, to be harmless. 166
157. See id. at 150-51.
158. See id. at 151.
159. See Christopher K. Hsee & S. Menon, Affection Effect in Consumer Choices
(1999) (unpublished study).
160. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the
Perception of Risk, 45 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 20 (1983); Alice M. Isen, Posi-
tive Affect and Decision Making, in Handbook of Emotions 261 (Michael Lewis &
Jeannette M. Haviland eds., 1993).
163. See George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Con-
sumption, 97 Econ. J. 666 (1987).
164. See Hendrickx, supra note 141, at 55-56.
165. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102.
166. See id.
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Individual differences in affective reactivity also are informa-
tive. Damasio relied upon brain-damaged individuals, apparently
lacking in the ability to associate emotion with anticipated out-
comes, to test his somatic-marker hypothesis. 167 Similar insensi-
tivity to the emotional meaning of future outcomes has been
attributed to psychopathic individuals and used to explain their
aberrant behaviors. 16 Using the Damasio card-selection task, Pe-
ters and Slovic found that normal subjects who reported them-
selves to be highly reactive to negative events made fewer
selections from decks with large losing payoffs.' 69 Conversely,
greater self-reported reactivity to positive events was associated
with a greater number of selections from high-gain decks.'170 Thus
individual differences in affective reactivity appear to play a role in
the learning and expression of risk-taking preferences.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAw: THE RATIONALITY OF
CIGARETTE SMOKING
I have, in Section II, provided a brief description of the experi-
ential mode of thinking and its embodiment in "the affect heuris-
tic." A large number of theoretical and empirical studies,
conducted by a multidisciplinary cadre of scientists (from neurolo-
gists to social psychologists), have created a view of human ration-
ality that is much more complex than the standard economic
model. One might expect that such a broad theory of human think-
ing and rationality would relate to the law in many important
ways and this, indeed, is being demonstrated. For example,
Kahneman and colleagues have shown that monetary judgments
as diverse as willingness to pay for the provision of a public good
(e.g., protection of an endangered species) or a punitive damage
award in a personal injury lawsuit seem to be derived from atti-
167. See Damasio, supra note 29.
168. See Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy, Fear Arousal and Anticipated Pain, 16
Psychol. Rep. 499 (1965); Christopher J. Patrick, Emotion and Psychopathy: Star-
tling New Insights, 31 Psychophysiology 415 (1994).
169. See Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Springs of Action: Affective and Ana-




tudes based on emotion rather than on indicators of economic
value.1 71
In this section I shall discuss another important activity, ciga-
rette smoking, the rationality of which has been under scrutiny by
the law. For many years, law and economics have been brought to
bear on this activity in a rather standard way. I shall draw upon
our understanding of experiential thinking and the affect heuristic
to document the inadequacies of the standard account.
A. Do Cigarette Smokers Know the Risks?
In numerous legal battles around the country, lawyers for the
cigarette industry have been relying heavily on the argument that
smokers know the health risks of cigarettes and are making a ra-
tional decision to smoke because the benefits to them outweigh the
risks. Such "informed consumers," the lawyers claim, have no
cause for complaint if they become ill.
Do individuals really know and understand the risks entailed
by their smoking decisions? This question is particularly important
in the case of young persons, because most smokers start during
childhood and adolescence. After many years of intense publicity
about the hazards of smoking cigarettes, it is generally believed
that every teenager and adult in the United States knows that
smoking is hazardous to one's health. Perhaps the most enthusias-
tic empirical demonstration of this "fact" comes from research on
perceptions of risk from smoking reported in two papers and in a
book by Viscusi. 172
Viscusi aimed to address the following question: "at the time
when individuals initiate their smoking activity, do they under-
stand the consequences of their actions and make rational deci-
sions?"173  Viscusi further defined the appropriate test of
rationality in terms of "whether individuals are incorporating the
available information about smoking risks and are making sound
171. See Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness
to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5
(1994); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychol-
ogy of Punitive Damages, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 49, 49-51 (1998).
172. See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Viscusi I]; W. Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risk?, 98 J. Pol. Econ.
1253 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Variations in Risk Perceptions and Smoking Deci-
sions, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 577 (1991).
173. Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 11.
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decisions, given their own preference .... "1 74 Viscusi even ques-
tioned whether one's future self may have different preferences,
though he never tested this possibility: "Does the 20-year old
smoker fully recognize how his or her future self will value health
as compared with smoking?" 175 In keeping with the analytic mode
of thinking, Viscusi's beginning smoker is portrayed as a young
economist, weighing the benefits against the risks before making
the fateful decision to light up: "one might expect some individuals
to rationally choose to smoke if the weight they place on the bene-
fits derived from smoking exceeds their assessment of the expected
losses stemming from the risks .... -1 76
The data relied upon by Viscusi consisted of a national survey
of more than 3,000 persons age 16 or older in which respondents
were asked: "Among 100 cigarette smokers, how many do you
think will get lung cancer because they smoke?"'177 Analyzing re-
sponses to this question, Viscusi found that people greatly overesti-
mated the risks of a smoker getting lung cancer. 178 They also
overestimated overall mortality rates from smoking and loss of life
expectancy from smoking. 179 Moreover, young people (age 16-21)
overestimated these risks to an even greater extent than did older
people.' 80 Perceptions of risk from smoking were also found to be
predictive of whether and how much people smoked, for young and
old alike.' 8 '
Viscusi argued that those data support a rational learning
model in which consumers respond appropriately to information
and make reasonable tradeoffs between the risks and benefits of
smoking.' 8 2 With respect to youth, he concluded that his findings
"strongly contradict the models of individuals being lured into
smoking at an early age without any cognizance of the risks
.... 3 Viscusi further concluded that young people are so well-
174. Id. at 12.
175. Id. at 119.
176. Id. at 139.
177. Id. at 64.
178. See id. at 68. The mean estimate was 43 of 100, compared to an actuarial
value that Viscusi claimed was only 5-10 of 100. Similar overestimation was found
in subsequent studies asking about lung cancer mortality rather than incidence.
179. See Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 77.
180. See id. at 72.
181. See id. at 99-100.
182. See id. at 100.
183. Id. at 143.
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informed that there is no justification for informational campaigns
designed to boost their awareness.'" Finally, he observed that so-
cial policies that allow smoking at age eighteen "run little risk of
exposing uninformed decision-makers to the potential hazards of
smoking .... "18 5 Viscusi's data and conclusions thus appear to
lend support to the defense used by cigarette companies to fend off
lawsuits from diseased smokers: These people knew the risks and
made an informed, rational choice to smoke.186
Viscusi's arguments would seem, at first glance, to have merit
from the standpoint of experiential thinking as well as from his
analytic perspective. On experiential grounds, the well-known as-
sociation of cigarettes with cancer, a dreaded disease, should cre-
ate enough negative affect to stimulate a powerful drive to avoid
this harmful behavior. Consistent with this view, many people do
decide not to smoke or to quit smoking. The minority who initiate
smoking or maintain the habit may also be doing so on the basis of
informed experiential or analytic thinking that has led them to
conclude that the benefits outweigh the risks.
184. See id. at 143-44.
185. Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 149.
186. Viscusi interpreted his findings as follows: "there is substantial evidence
that individuals make tradeoffs with respect to smoking risks and other valued
attributes. This behavior is consistent with... models of rational behavior .... ."
Id. at 144; "it is unlikely that smoking rates greatly exceed what would prevail in a
fully informed market context." Id.
Other scholars, quoted on the dust jacket of the book, bought Viscusi's argu-
ment. For example, Alan Schwartz of Yale Law School stated:
This book combines two disciplines, cognitive psychology and the econom-
ics of risk, to make an important contribution to the smoking debate. Vis-
cusi shows that persons in all age groups overestimate smoking risks, as
theory predicts, and that persons behave rationally respecting the smok-
ing decision given their perception of the facts. After these findings, the
smoking decision can justifiably be regulated only in consequence of third
party effects, not because consumers make poor health choices.
Id. Also, Robert D. Tollison of George Mason University stated:
Viscusi's book will provide the intellectual basis and framework for a long
overdue reassessment of the role of government in protecting consumers
and workers from certain types of risky behavior. It should come as no
surprise that the government has once again been overzealous in their
protection of consumers and workers from the dangers of smoking by
mandating hazard warnings on packages, restricting television advertis-
ing and imposing restrictions on where smoking is permitted. Viscusi
analyzes the government's actions and offers us some interesting routes
out of the swamp of overprotection.
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On the other hand, there appear to be a number of ways in
which reliance on experiential thinking might lead smokers to fail
to appreciate risks and to act in ways that are not in their best
interests. In particular, the exposure to information that Viscusi
believes causes overestimation of risk cuts both ways. The major
exposure comes from massive advertising campaigns designed to
associate positive imagery and positive affect with cigarette smok-
ing. A recent ad for Kool Natural Lights, for example, featured a
picture of a beautiful waterfall on the cigarette package. In addi-
tion, the word "natural" appears 13 times in the ad.
More subtle than the content of cigarette ads is the possibility
that the "mere exposure effect" resulting from viewing them re-
peatedly also contributes to positive affect and liking for smoking
in general and for specific brands of cigarettes in particular.' 8 7
Through the workings of the affect heuristic, this positive affect
would be expected not only to enhance one's attraction to smoking
but also to depress the perception of risk.188
Within the experiential mode of thinking, "seeing is believing,"
and young people in particular are likely to see little or no visible
harm from the smoking done by their friends or themselves. In
this sense, smoking risks are not "available."' 8 9
Viscusi's arguments are also lacking in a number of other re-
spects, as I have indicated in several previous studies. 190 Here I
shall focus on two failings, both of which relate to experiential
thinking. The first reflects the repetitive nature of cigarette smok-
ing and the cumulation of risk over a long period of time. The sec-
ond reflects young people's failure to appreciate the risks of
becoming addicted to smoking.
"Cigarette smoking is a behavior that takes place one cigarette
at a time."191 A person smoking one pack of cigarettes every day
187. See Bornstein, supra note 42; Zajonc, supra note 41.
188. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
189. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 146.
190. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 Duke L.J.
1133 (1998); Paul Slovic, What Does it Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk? Adoles-
cents' Perception of Short-Term and Long-Term Consequences of Smoking, 13 J.
Behav. Decision Making 259 (2000) [hereinafter Slovic I]; Paul Slovic, Rejoinder:
The Perils of Viscusi's Analysis of Smoking Risk Perceptions, 13 J. Behav. Decision
Making 273 (2000).
191. Slovic I, supra note 190, at 261.
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for forty years "lights up" about 300,000 times. 192 Although most
smokers acknowledge a high degree of risk associated with many
years of smoking, many believe they can get away with some lesser
amount of smoking before the risk takes hold.193 Many young
smokers, in particular, believe that smoking for only a few years
poses negligible risk.19 4 They are more prone to believe in the
safety of short-term smoking than are young nonsmokers. 195
Belief in the near-term safety of smoking combines in an insid-
ious way with a tendency for young smokers to be uninformed
about, or underestimate, the difficulty of stopping smoking.196 Re-
cent research indicates that adolescents begin to show evidence of
nicotine dependence within days to weeks of the onset of occasional
use of tobacco. 197 Many young people regret their decision to start
smoking and attempt to stop unsuccessfully. 198 The 1989 Teenage
Attitudes and Practices Survey found that 74% of adolescent smok-
ers reported that they had thought seriously about quitting and
49% had tried to quit in the previous six months.199 A longitudinal
survey conducted as part of the University of Michigan's Monitor-
ing the Future Study found that 85% of high school seniors who
occasionally smoked predicted that they probably, or definitely,
would not be smoking in five years.2°° Thirty-two percent of high
school seniors who smoked one pack of cigarettes per day made the
same prediction. 201 However, in a follow-up study five to six years
later, of those who had smoked at least one pack per day as se-
niors, only 13% had quit and 69% still smoked one pack or more
per day.20 2 Of those who smoked one to five cigarettes per day as
192. See id. at 1137.
193. See id. at 1137-38.
194. See id. at 1141.
195. See id. at 1138.
196. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
197. See Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Initial Symptoms of Nicotine Dependence in
Adolescents, 9 Tobacco Control 313 (2000).
198. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
199. See Karen F. Allen et al., Teenage Tobacco Use: Data Estimates from the
Teenage Attitudes and Practice Survey, United States, 1989, 14 Advance Data, No.
224 (1993).
200. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
201. See id.
202. See id. (citing Lloyd Johnston et al., National Survey Results on Drug Use
From the Monitoring the Future Study (National Institute on Drug Abuse ed.,
1993)); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Preventing Tobacco Use
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seniors, only 30% had quit (60% had expected to do so) and 44%
had actually increased their cigarette consumption. 20 3
The belief pattern that emerges from these and various other
studies is one in which many young smokers perceive themselves
to be at little or no risk from each cigarette smoked because they
expect to stop smoking before any damage to their health oc-
curs. 20 4 In reality, a high percentage of young smokers continue to
smoke over a long period of time despite the fact that they are cer-
tainly placed at risk by their habit.20 5
B. New Data: The Dominance of Experiential Thinking
Viscusi's arguments about perceptions of risk and the in-
formed, choices made by smokers assume the preeminence of the
analytic mode of thinking. Viscusi's beginning smoker is portrayed
as a young economist, rationally weighing the benefits against the
risks before making the fateful decision to start smoking. But the
evidence for smokers' short-term perspectives and underestima-
tion of the grip of addiction suggests that experiential and affective
forces are leading many young people to make smoking decisions
that they later regard as mistakes.
Evidence for this view comes from data recently collected in a
national telephone survey of more than 3,500 individuals con-
ducted on behalf of The Annenberg School for Communication in
the Fall of 1999 and Winter of 2000.206 Households were selected
through random-digit dialing and, within the household, a resident
aged 14 and older was selected randomly for the interview. 20 7
Young people were oversampled. Completed interviews were ob-
tained for 2002 members of a "youth sample" ages 14-22 and 1504
members of an adult sample, ranging in age from 23-95.208 Within
the youth sample, there were 478 smokers and 1524 non-
Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General, S/N 017-001-004901-0,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. (1994).
203. See id.
204. See Slovic 1, supra note 190, at 264.
205. See id.




smokers. 20 9 Among adults there were 310 smokers and 1194
nonsmokers. 210
Recall that the experiential mode is automatic, feeling based
and not always accessible to conscious awareness. People acting
experientially may not sense that they are consciously deliberat-
ing. Experiential thinking is evident throughout the survey.211
Almost 80% of the adult smokers surveyed answered "not at all"
when asked if they thought about how smoking might affect their
health when they first began to smoke.212 Young smokers ap-
peared more likely to have thought about health when they began
to smoke, but their most frequent answer was still "not at all."21 3
However, now that they smoke, most of these individuals say they
do think about the health effects. 214 A substantial proportion of
smokers also say that, since they have started smoking, they have
heard of health risks they did not know about when they
started.215
Most telling are the answers to questions 19e and 19f. Far
more beginning smokers were thinking about "trying something
new and exciting" than were thinking about health.216 When
asked how long they thought they would continue to smoke when
they first started, the majority of young and older smokers said
that they did not think about it.217
Our data indicate that most smokers neither want to continue
smoking nor expect to do s0.218 The majority of adult and youth
smokers have made more than one attempt to quit 219 and about
65% of the adults and 84% of the youth say they plan to quit.220 Of
those who plan to quit, about 78% of the adults and 72% of the
youth plan to do so within the next year. 22 ' When asked whether
209. See id. A "smoker" was defined as someone who said they had smoked at
least one cigarette within the past 30 days.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See infra app., tbl.5. (referring to question 19a).
213. See id.
214. See id. (referring to question 19c).
215. See id. (referring to question 19d).
216. See id. (referring to question 19e).
217. See id. (referring to question 190.
218. See infra app., tbl.5.
219. See infra app., tbl.6.
220. See infra app., tbl.7 (referring to question 29).
221. See id. (referring to question 29a).
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they would have successfully quit smoking if they were called
again in a year, 78% of the adults and 83% of the teens said
"yes."
2 2 2
Tables 8 and 9 present the responses to these same three ques-
tions about quitting, conditioned by the number of past attempts to
quit2 23 and by the length of time the individual has been smok-
ing.2 24 In Table 8, we see that, except for adults who had never
tried to quit, a substantial majority of smokers planned to quit 22 5
and to do so within the next year,226 even though they had unsuc-
cessfully attempted to quit a number of times before. Thus we see
that, among youth who had attempted to quit ten or more times,
91.3% still planned to quit and 85.7% of those expected to do so in
the first year.22 7 This estimated one-year time line was lower
(61.1%) when elicited in Question 29b, but it was still far greater
than the "no" response (16.7%).228
Similar optimism about quitting was evident among long-time
smokers.229 Even among those who had been smoking for more
than five years, 64% of adults and 80% of teens planned to quit,
and most of these individuals planned to do so within the next
year.230 The median age of the adults who had been smoking for
more than five years was forty-one, which makes it likely that they
have actually been smoking for more than twenty years. 231 It is
noteworthy that these older smokers were as optimistic as young
smokers about quitting within the next year.232
Although we have seen above that most smokers were not
thinking about health risks when they first began to smoke, some
of those who were may have been reassured by the thought that
there is little or no harm to smoking in the short-run. 233 Slovic
observed this in a sample of high-school age smokers and the pre-
222. See id. (referring to question 29b).
223. See infra app., tbl.8.
224. See infra app., tbl.9.
225. See id. (referring to question 29).
226. See id. (referring to questions 29a & 29b).
227. See id. (referring to question 29a).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See infra app., tbl.9.
231. See id. Note that the longest time in the response options presented by
the interviewer was "more than 5 years."
232. See id.
233. See Slovic I, supra note 190.
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sent findings replicate this result.23 4 When asked to "Imagine
someone who starts to smoke a pack of cigarettes a day at age 16,"
29.7% of adult smokers and 26.4% of teen smokers agreed with the
statement: "There is usually no risk to the person at all for the first
few years." Agreement was less among non-smokers (18.8% for
adults and 20.6% for teens).
When asked "How long, if ever, do you think it takes for smok-
ing to seriously harm the health of a new smoker?," 44.8% of adult
smokers and 32.0% of teen smokers answered five years or more.
C. Addiction
Loewenstein has proposed a theoretical perspective that por-
trays addiction as an extreme form of a class of behaviors that are
controlled by "visceral factors."235 Visceral factors include drive
states such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire, moods and emotions,
physical pain and, for addiction, intense craving for a drug or ciga-
rette.236 From the experiential perspective, it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to appreciate one's own susceptibility to visceral in-
fluences. As Loewenstein observes: "Unlike currently experienced
visceral factors, which have a disproportionate impact on behavior,
delayed visceral factors tend to be ignored or severely un-
derweighted in decision-making. Today's pain, hunger, anger, etc.
are palpable, but the same sensations anticipated in the future re-
ceive little weight."237
The survey provides abundant evidence regarding the difficul-
ties of stopping smoking. First, as shown earlier, in Table 6, the
majority of adult and young smokers have attempted to quit, usu-
ally more than once.238 Second, despite their lack of success in
quitting, most of these individuals plan to stop smoking in the near
future.239
Another indication of the short-term perspective of smokers
and their misperception of the ease of quitting comes from the find-
ing that only 7.4% of the adult smokers and 4.8% of the teens ex-
234. See id. at 261-65.
235. See George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in Getting
Hooked: Rationality and Addiction (1999).
236. See id. at 239.
237. Id. at 240.
238. See infra app., tbl.6.
239. See infra app., tbls.7, 8 & 9.
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pected to smoke for more than 5 years when they began,240 yet
87.1% of these adults and 26.4% of these teens reported that they
had now been smoking for more than 5 years.
When asked whether they consider themselves addicted to cig-
arettes, 76.4% of the adult smokers and 58.8% of the teens said
yes.241 The proportion of adults and teens who felt addicted in-
creased sharply with the number of attempts to quit and length of
time smoking.242
D. Viscusi's Quantitative Risk Estimates Are Unreliable
Viscusi has placed great weight in the validity of his quantita-
tive questions about smoking risk perceptions. However, there are
a number of reasons to be suspicious about the reliability of an-
swers to his questions about the relative frequency of lung cancer
among 100 smokers. First, he asks the respondent to estimate the
risks to 100 smokers, not to oneself. Answers for oneself would
likely be lower, as a result of optimism bias.243 Second, Tversky
and Koehler developed and tested a theoretical model, support the-
ory, showing that respondents asked to judge the likelihood for one
focal event (e.g., lung cancer) produce higher probabilities than re-
spondents asked for judgments of the same event in the context of
other alternative events.244
Third, we would expect that young smokers, as experiential
rather than analytical thinkers who do not expect to be smoking
much longer, would not be paying careful attention to tracking
lung cancer rates among smokers. Hence they would not have a
firm, quantitative estimate in their heads.
We tested these suspicions by first replicating Viscusi's line of
questioning and then adding a variation in the question format
along the line suggested by Tversky and Koehler's theory. Early in
the survey, respondents were asked to "Imagine 100 cigarette
smokers, both men and women, who smoked cigarettes their entire
adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you think will die
240. See infra app., tbl.5.
241. See infra app., tbl.10 (referring to bottom row).
242. See id. (referring to questions 30 & 31).
243. See Neil D. Weinstein, Accuracy of Smokers' Risk Perceptions, 20 Annals
Behav. Med. 135 (1998).
244. See Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory: A Nonextensional
Representation of Subjective Probability, 101 Psychol. Rev. 547, 547-65 (1994).
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from lung cancer?" This question was immediately followed by a
similar question asking about the number of lung cancer deaths
among 100 non-smokers. Next, a third question was presented,
which asked for estimates of the number of deaths among the same
100 smokers from: a) automobile accidents; b) heart disease; c)
stroke; d) lung cancer; and e) all other causes combined.
Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of the
estimates for lung cancer among the 100 smokers in the first and
third questions.245 The answers to the first question, about lung
cancer alone, were in the range obtained in Viscusi's surveys, with
estimates by the youth sample being larger than estimates by the
adults (60.4 vs. 48.5).24 6 However, the estimates for lung cancer
decrease by more than 50% when made in the context of the other
causes.247 The proportion of respondents who reduced their first
answer when given a small number of alternative causes of death
in Question 3 was 72.6% (adults) and 80.9% (youth).248 Further-
more, the correlation between the two estimates, a form of reliabil-
ity, was very low; only .33 for the adults and .19 for the younger
respondents. 249 These results thus replicate and extend findings
obtained earlier with a sample of university students.250
These data indicate that our respondents, young and old alike,
do not have reliable quantitative knowledge about smoking risks.
One can get almost any estimate one wishes for lung cancer (or
other smoking-induced causes of death) simple by varying the
number of other causes that are also being judged. This conclusion
is consistent with other theoretical and empirical research demon-
strating the dependence of quantitative judgments such as these
on the form of the question and response scale.251 It is also consis-
tent with the view that smokers are not thinking analytically
about the risks they are taking.




249. See infra app., figs.4 & 5.
250. See Paul Slovic, Rejoinder: The Perils of Viscusi's Analysis of Smoking
Risk Perceptions, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 273 (2000).
251. See, e.g., Tversky & Koehler, supra note 244; Slovic et aL, supra note 22.
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E. The Failure of Rationality
Viscusi argued that smokers were making an informed, ra-
tional decision to smoke.252 Viscusi asserted that the key question
pertaining to the failure of the rational model is one in which an
individual, asked to go back in time to the moment of decision and
repeat the choice, would not make the same choice again. 253
Slovic asked that question in a small survey of smokers at the
University of Oregon and in a poll of Oregon residents. The new
telephone survey asked it as well of all smokers: "If you had it to do
over again, would you start smoking?" 254
The results, shown in Table 12, are clear. More than 85% of
adult smokers and about 80% of teen smokers answered "no."255
Moreover, the pattern of responses shown in the table was similar
for both young and old smokers.256 The more they felt addicted to
cigarettes, the more often they had tried to quit, the longer they
had been smoking, and the more cigarettes they were smoking per
day, the more likely they were to say "no."257
Recall Viscusi's central question: "at the time when individu-
als initiate their smoking activity, do they understand the conse-
quences of their actions and make rational decisions?"258 The data
presented here indicate that the answer to this question is "no."259
Most beginning smokers do not appreciate how their future selves
will perceive the risks from smoking and value the tradeoff be-
tween health and the need to smoke.26°
This is a strong repudiation of the model of informed rational
choice. It fits well with the findings indicating that smokers give
little conscious thought to risk when they begin to smoke.261 They
appear to be lured into the behavior by the prospects of fun and
252. See Viscusi I, supra note 172.
253. See W. Kip Viscusi, Deposition in the Matter of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Matter, No. D09285, Sept. 24, 1998.
254. Slovic, supra note 250.
255. See infra app., tbl.12.
256. See id.
257. The perception that smoking was risky to one's health also correlated sig-
nificantly with the "no" response for both young and adult smokers.





excitement.26 2 Most begin to think of risk only after starting to
smoke and gaining what to them is new information about health
risks.263
The increased likelihood of repudiating the earlier decision,
exhibited by those who have been smoking for the longest time,
those who are currently smoking the most cigarettes, those who
perceive themselves at high risk from smoking, those who have
tried most often to quit, and those who acknowledge their addic-
tion, paints a sad portrait of individuals who are unable to control
a behavior that they have come to recognize as harmful.
These disturbing findings underscore the distinction that be-
havioral decision theorists now make between decision utility and
experience utility.264 This distinction arises from numerous stud-
ies of persons experiencing very good outcomes (e.g., winning the
lottery) or very bad ones (e.g., becoming paraplegic, testing positive
for HIV). Winning the lottery leaves people much less happy than
expected and people adjust to being paraplegic or HIV positive
much better than expected.265 In the case of smoking, the discrep-
ancy between decision utility and experience utility underscores
the veracity of Loewenstein's visceral account of addiction.
V. CONCLUSION: RATIONAL ACTORS AND RATIONAL FOOLS
We can see now that the central question underlying this Sym-
posium: "Rational Actors or Rational Fools?" was oversimplified.
Rationality is not only a product of the analytical mind, but of the
experiential mind as well. As Damasio observed:
The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in
either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding
force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which
emotion and feeling are notable expressions. Moreover, even
after reasoning strategies became established . their ef-
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3
Legal Theory 105 (1997); Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing
Taste: Do People Know What They Like?, 5 J. Behav. Decision Making 187 (1992);
George Lewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feel-
ings, in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85-105 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
265. See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Hap-
piness Relative?, 36 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 917 (1978).
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fective deployment probably depends, to a considerable ex-
tent, on a continued ability to experience feelings.286
Ironically, the perception and integration of affective feelings,
within the experiential system, may be the kind of high-level max-
imization process postulated by economic theories since the days of
Jeremy Bentham. These feelings form the neural and psychologi-
cal substrate of utility. In this sense, the affect heuristic enables
us to be rational actors in many important situations. But not in
all situations. It works beautifully when our experience enables us
to anticipate accurately how much we will like the consequences of
our decisions. It fails miserably when the consequences turn out to
be much different in character than we anticipated.
In the latter situations, the Rational Actor becomes the Ra-
tional Fool.
266. Damasio, supra note 29, at xii.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
TWO MODES OF THINKING. COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIENTIAL
AND RATIONAL SYSTEMS
2 6 7
Experiential System Rational System
1. Holistic 1. Analytic
2. Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented 2. Logical: Reason oriented (what is
sensible)
3. Associationistic connections 3. Logical connections
4. Behavior mediated by "vibes" from 4. Behavior mediated by conscious
past experiences appraisal of events
5. Encodes reality in concrete images, 5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols,
metaphors, and narratives words, and numbers
6. More rapid processing: Oriented 6. Slower processing: Oriented toward
toward immediate action delayed action
7. Self-evidently valid: "experiencing is 7. Requires justification via logic and
believing" evidence
TABLE 2
IMAGES, RATINGS AND SUMMATION SCORES FOR ONE
RESPONDENT2 6 8
Image Image
Stimulus number Image rating
SAN DIEGO 1 very nice 2
SAN DIEGO 2 good beaches 2
SAN DIEGO 3 zoo 2
SAN DIEGO 4 busy freeway 1
SAN DIEGO 5 easy to find way 1
SAN DIEGO 6 pretty town 2
Sum= 10
DENVER 1 high 2
DENVER 2 crowded 0
DENVER 3 cool 2
DENVER 4 pretty 1
DENVER 5 busy airport -2
DENVER 6 busy streets -2
Sums 1
Note. Based on these summation scores, this person's predicted preference for a
vacation site would be San Diego.
267. See Epstein, supra note 25.
268. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.
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TABLE 3
ATTRIBUTES OF Two DICTIONARIES IN HSEE'S STUDY2 6 9
Year of Number
publication of entries Any defects?
Dictionary A 1993 10,000 No, it's like new
Dictionary B 1993 20,000 Yes, the cover is torn;
otherwise it's like new
TABLE 4
PROPORTION DOMINANCE AND AIRPORT SAFETY
Saving a percentage of 150 lives receives higher support ratings than does saving 150
lives.
Potential Benefit
Save Save Save Save Save
150 lives 98% 95% 90% 85%
Mean support 10.4 13.6 12.9 11.7 10.9
Median, 9.8 14.3 14.1 11.3 10.8
% of ratings L 13 37 75 69 35 31
'cell entries in these rows describe mean and median responses to the question: "How
much would you support this proposed measure to purchase the new equipment?"
(Critics argue that the money spent on this system could be better spent enhancing
other aspects of airport safety). The response scale ranged from 0 (would not support at
all) to 20 (very strong support). An overall ANOVA resulted in F 4,20 = 3.36, p = .01. The
save 98% and save 95% conditions were beth significantly different from the save 150
lives condition at p < .05, Tukey HSD test.
269. See Hsee I, supra note 78.
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TABLE 5
PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE BEGINNING SMOKER
Adult Smokers Young Smokers
. N=310 N=478
19a. When you first started
to smoke, how much did
you think about how
smoking might affect
your health?
19c. How much do you
think about the health
effects of smoking now?
19d. Since you started smoking,
have you heard of any
health risks of smoking
that you didn't know
about when you started?
19e. When you first started
smoking, did you think
more about how smoking
would affect your future
health or about how you
were trying something
new and exciting?
19f. When you first started
smoking, how long did






















Less than 1 year
1-5 years
More than 5 years
Didn't think about it
Don't know/refuse
TABLE 6
ABOUT HOW MANY TIMES, IF ANY, HAVE YOU TRIED TO
QUIT SMOKING?
Adult Smokers Young Smokers






Don't know/refuse 2.6 1.3
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TABLE 7





29. Do you plan to quit Yes 65.5 83.7
smoking? No 30.6 13.2
Don't Know/refuse 3.9 3.1
29a. When are you planning Next 6 months 49.3 57.0
to quit? 6 months to 1 year 24.1 19.5
More than 1 year from now 15.8 18.2
Don't Know/refuse 10.8 5.2
29b. If we called you in a Yes 77.8 83.3
year, would you guess No 11.4 9.8




PLANS TO QUIT SMOKING BY NUMBER OF PAST ATTEMPTS TO QUIT
Number of Attempts to Quit
0 1-4 5-9 10+
AS YS AS YS AS YS AS YS
Q29 Do you plan to Yes 39.4 74.7 67.8 89.5 88.9 100.0 79.3 91.3
quit smoking? No 54.6 22.0 28.1 7.7 11.1 0.0 20.7 8.7
Don't know 6.1 3.3 4.1 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Q29a When are you Next 6 mo. 38.5 56.6 46.6 55.0 62.5 57.9 52.2 76.2
planning to quit? 6 mo - 1 yr 26.9 15.4 27.6 23.0 18.8 21.0 17.4 9.5
> 1 yr from now 15.4 23.5 17.2 16.3 15.6 15.8 8.7 9.5
Don't know 19.2 4.4 8.6 5.9 3.1 5.3 21.7 4.8
Q29b If called in a Yes 88.2 86.7 81.4 85.0 69.2 66.7 56.2 61.1
year, would you No 0.0 7.1 9.3 9.2 19.2 26.7 25.0 16.7
have quit? Don't know 11,8 6.1 9.3 5.8 11.5 6.7 18.8 22.2
Note: AS represents adult smokers and YS represents young smokers.
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TABLE 9
PLANS TO QUIT SMOKING BY LENGTH OF TIME SMOKING
207
Length of time smoking
For month About
or less I year 1-5 years > 5 years
AS YS AS YS AS YS AS YS
Q29 Do you plan to Yes - 81.4 - 82.5 74.2 87.3 63.7 80.2
quit smoking? No - 15.2 - 14.3 25.8 11.0 32.2 15.9
Don't know - 3.4 - 3.2 0.0 1.8 4.1 4.0
Q29a When are you Next 6 mo. - 85.4 - 55.8 39.1 51.8 50.0 54.5
planning to quit? 6 mo - 1 yr - 6.2 - 28.8 17.4 21.6 25.6 16.8
> 1 yr from now - 2.1 - 7.7 17.4 22.1 15.7 23.8
Don't know - 6.2 - 7.7 26.1 4.5 8.7 5.0
Q29b If called in a Yes - 90.9 - 86.4 92.3 81.5 75.4 80.6
year, would you No - 6.8 - 6.8 7.7 10.3 12.3 12.5
have quit? Don't know - 2.3 - 6.8 0.0 8.2 12.3 6.9
Note: AS represents adult smokers and YS represents young smokers.
TABLE 10







Q30. About how many times, if 0 59.1 37.9 3.0 41.2 57.7 1.1
any, have you tried to quit 1 76.9 23.1 0.0 56.7 43.3 0.0
smoking? 2-4 78.2 21.0 0.8 75.7 24.3 0.0
5-9 91.7 8.3 0.0 73.7 26.3 0.0
10+ 93.1 6.9 0.0 91.3 8.7 0.0
Q31. How long have you Few months - - - 3.4 96.6 0.0
smoked? or less
- 1 year - - - 33.3 65.1 1.6
1-5 years 64.5 35.5 0.0 64.5 35.5 0.0
> 5 years 79.6 19.6 0.7 88.1 11.1 0.8
All Respondents 76.4 22.6 1.0 58.8 40.4 0.8
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TABLE 11
JUDGED DEATHS FROM LUNG CANCER AMONG 100 SMOKERS
Adult sample Youth sample
(N = 1416) (N = 2002)
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Question 1 48.5 27.4 60.4 25.1
r 13 = .33 r13 = .19
Question 3 23.5 17.5 28.3 19.4
% Q3 < Q1 72.6 80.9
TABLE 12
SMOKING: WOULD You START AGAIN?
Adult Smokers Young Smokers
(N = 310) (N = 478)
Yes No Yes No
Overall 11.9 85.5 17.0 80.1
Do you consider yourself addicted to cigarettes?
Yes 11.4 86.9 13.9 84.3
No 14.3 81,4 21.8 74.6
More than average 7.7 90.4 7.1 92.9
Same as average 11.1 85.6 15.3 80.9
less than average 16.2 83,8 20.4 77.0
Number of times tried to quit?
0 27.3 66.7 22.5 73.1
1-4 9.4 88.3 14.5 83.9
5-9 8.3 91.7 10.5 84.2
10+ 0.0 100.0 4.4 95.6
How long have you smoked?
_< few months - - 22.0 74.6
1 year - - 20.6 76.2
1-5 years 19.4 80.7 16.7 79.4
> 5 years 11.1 86.3 13.5 86.5
Cigarettes smoked per day last 30 days?
< 1 16.1 83.9 25.3 69.5
1-5 10.5 89.5 18.9 77.5
6-10 10.0 88.0 19.4 79.6
11-14 11.1 86.1 13.4 83.6
15-19 15.4 82.0 5.9 91.2
20 10.4 85.1 7.0 93.0
> 20 11.4 86.4 12.1 87.9
Notes: Same patterns for adults and teens with sense of being addicted, trying
unsuccessfully to quit, having smoked for longer time, smoking more cigarettes/day.
Sense of being addicted goes with trying unsuccessfully to quit, length of time smoking,




Stimuli in ice cream study by Hsee (1998).
cups and the amounts of ice cream.






A model of the affect heuristic explaining the risk/benefit confounding observed by
Alhakami and Slovic (1994). Judgments of risk and benefit are assumed to be de-
rived by reference to an overall affective evaluation of the stimulus item.
270. See Hsee I, supra note 78.
271. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
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FIGURE 3272
A B
Nuclear Power Nuclear Power
Affect 
: , )
Information says Risk inferred Inforrnation says Risk inferred






Risk inferred Information says
to be high "Risk is high"
Risk inferred
to be low
Model showing how information about benefit (A) or information about risk (B)
could increase the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power and lead to infer-
ence about risk and benefit that coincide affectively the information given. Simi-
larly, information could decrease the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power
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# Lung Cancer Deaths: Judgment 1
Sunflower plot showing the relationship between adult respondents' estimates of
lung cancer deaths among 100 smokers. Judgment 1 asked only about lung can-
cer. Judgment 2 asked about lung cancer and other causes of death. Open circles
represent 1 respondent. Multiple cases at a point are represented by the number
of petals on the sunflower.
* N=39
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FIGURE 5
Youth
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# Lung Cancer Deaths: Judgment 1
Sunflower plot showing the relationship between young respondents' estimates of
lung cancer deaths among 100 smokers. Judgment 1 asked only about lung can-
cer. Judgment 2 asked about lung cancer and other causes of death. Open circles
represent 1 respondent. Multiple cases at a point are represented by the number
of petals on the sunflower.
# N=39
